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It would appear that Celander had the
most fun writing part 3, in which he
looks at the evolution of carrier warfare.
His engineering background shines
forth as he takes the reader through a
series of comparisons. Was concentration or dispersion of carriers more
effective? What was the proper mix of
bombers and fighters? One of Celander’s
more intriguing speculations pairs a
lone battleship against a lone carrier.
The author concludes that, by the later
phases of the war, the odds were with the
battleship; however, he acknowledges
the very great unlikelihood of such
an encounter ever occurring. While
this may seem an esoteric question,
Celander is just getting started.

to handle a spectrum of targets. The
quad 40 mm gun well may have been
the best surface-based aircraft killer
in the inventory, but that was not the
five-inch gun mount’s only job.

Celander spends significant time
examining the effectiveness of seaborne
antiaircraft guns. At several points he
reminds readers that American efforts
to develop reliable proximity fuses were
extraordinarily expensive yet disappointing in their results. He also looks
at the effectiveness of large-caliber
guns when deployed against aircraft.
After painstaking analysis, Celander
concludes that the U.S Navy would have
been served far better if every five-inch
gun mount had been removed from
carrier escorts and replaced with quad
40 mm mounts. As the solution to an
interesting thought experiment, the
effort is convincing, but this is, in the
end, an exercise performed on something like the famous frictionless plane
of physics. A battleship’s or cruiser’s
secondary batteries had more to do
than just provide antiaircraft fire; in a
surface action, the five-inch batteries
would engage in direct combat with
enemy ships, in addition to providing
illumination. During shore bombardments the same batteries would
provide a wide variety of explosives

With all that said, Celander does the
reader at least one tremendous service.
His meticulous accounting illuminates
the very great risks that naval aviators
took and the extreme losses they
endured, particularly American pilots
during the first two years of the war.
Technological limitations and operational realities all too often resulted in
these young men being expended
like flesh-and-blood ammunition.
Their willingness to accept long odds
and their dedication in performing
their missions represent one aspect of
carrier operations during World War
II that never should be forgotten.
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The book concludes with something
of a hodgepodge of topics. Celander
comes out in favor of armored flight
decks and single hangar decks. He
suggests that carrier air wings of the
future should be composed of drones
and manned aircraft, and those
manned aircraft should be subsonic
turboprops along the lines of the Super
Tucano. He also concludes that in
application John R. Boyd’s “OODA
loop” is more useful than Alfred Thayer
Mahan’s principles of naval warfare.

RICHARD NORTON

In the Claws of the Tomcat: US Navy F-14 Tomcat
in Combat, 1987–2000, by Tom Cooper. Warwick, U.K.: Helion, 2021. 80 pages. $29.95.

As a junior officer in the U.S. Navy’s
F-14 Tomcat community, I routinely
heard three explanations for why the
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Navy’s premier fighter never scored
an air-to-air victory during Operation
DESERT STORM: the U.S. Air Force
refused to assign air-to-air missions
to the Navy; the Tomcat lacked the
necessary hardware to distinguish friend
from foe; and Iraqi aircrews turned
and ran from Tomcat radars, owing
to their experiences against Iranian
Tomcats during the Iran-Iraq War.
Tom Cooper leads off his new operational history, In the Claws of the Tomcat,
by setting up these same old saws.
Thereafter, while he does not outright
“bust” these three “myths”—which he
describes, probably more accurately,
as “contradictions” (p. 2)—he offers up
ample information for readers to make
up their own minds. In addition to
highly readable histories of U.S., Soviet,
Iranian, and Iraqi aircraft development
and acquisition, he provides detailed
descriptions of all major air-to-air
engagements in the Persian Gulf from
1987 to 2000 that pitted the Tomcat
against a host of Iranian and Iraqi
opponents. And he does all this in
a slim volume of eighty pages.
Although a self-taught historian and
researcher, Cooper accessed a great deal
of information, some of it previously
unpublished. While the majority of his
historical and technical background
information relies on secondary sources,
he did interview most Tomcat crews
involved in the engagements highlighted
in his book. More importantly, he had
access to official Iranian and Iraqi
publications as well as interviews with
former senior Iraqi aircrew members.
Citing classification concerns for the
Americans—and safety concerns for
the Iranians and Iraqis—he presents the
information on the engagements as oral
history. Additionally, the book features
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hundreds of archival photos, some
showing the actual aircraft and engagements themselves, as well as beautiful
watercolors of all aircraft involved.
Decidedly, In the Claws of the Tomcat is
pitched at the aviation enthusiast. The
book includes brief overviews of the
Cold War and the Iran-Iraq War—the
latter curiously called the “First”
Persian Gulf War, to distinguish it from
the “Second” Persian Gulf War (i.e.,
Operation DESERT STORM). Abbreviations for aircraft, weapons, and hardware
abound. That said, the descriptions of
the development of the Tomcat and the
aircraft that opposed it are presented in
layman’s terms and nicely describe the
different capabilities, tactics, and mindsets of the United States, Iran, and Iraq.
The second half of the book includes
descriptions of every air-to-air engagement featuring the Tomcat from 1987 to
2000—including three huge revelations.
First, Cooper lays out the evidence, which
includes photos of a damaged Iranian F-4,
for a “soft kill” of an Iranian F-4 in 1987
that the U.S. Navy long had discounted.
Second, he establishes, through multiple
eyewitness interviews, that Lieutenant
Commander Scott Speicher, the first
American casualty of the war, was shot
down by an Iraqi MiG-25, not a surfaceto-air missile, as long had been the
Navy’s official position. Third, Cooper
likewise argues that a shootdown long
credited to the dreaded “optical” mode
of the SA-6 surface-to-air missile system
(against which a generation of U.S.
aircrews grew up defending) may have
been instead another Iraqi air-to-air kill.
Although earlier in the book Cooper
draws excellent diagrams of basic
air-to-air maneuvers, unfortunately he
misses the opportunity to do the same
for these engagements. Although his
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research is thorough, the engagements
are somewhat hard to follow, and the
adjacent maps of Iraqi air bases do
not provide much clarity. Dedicated
diagrams would have been invaluable.
While Cooper does an admirable job
of comparing differing accounts of
complicated engagements and suggesting the most likely sequence of events,
his reliance on oral history colors his
overall assessments of the performance
of the Tomcat and its aircrews. It is
unclear whether Cooper believes the
performance of the Tomcat is underappreciated or that it is appreciated
correctly and he merely wants to provide
context. His three “contradictions” never
are dealt with explicitly, but the evidence
suggests that they—especially the latter
two: that the Tomcat lacked the proper
equipment and that Iraqi pilots knew to
avoid its powerful radar—are accurate.
Cooper goes out of his way to commend
the performance of Tomcat aircrews,
attributing their lack of air-to-air
victories to their strict adherence to
the rules of engagement and tactics;
however, two of the incidents described
feature some obvious mistakes
regarding both. Finally, there are
minor editorial quibbles involving the
aforementioned “First” and “Second”
Persian Gulf Wars, the occasional
improper use of military acronyms, and
his use of Soviet instead of the more
familiar NATO designations for some
weapon systems (e.g., referring to the
R-40D instead of the AA-6 Acrid),
but this may be an idiosyncrasy of the
military aviation enthusiast community.
Despite having heard these same stories
for years—some of them from the same
people Cooper interviewed—I definitely
learned something new from In the
Claws of the Tomcat. Cooper describes
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the Iranian and Iraqi pilots that the
U.S. Navy faced from 1987 to 2000 as
experienced combat veterans, and his
book rightly credits their performance.
Naval aviation sometimes overestimates
its future performance and underestimates that of its future opponents, but
it does so (and did so) at its own peril.
JOSHUA HAMMOND

Inside the US Navy of 1812–1815, by William S.
Dudley. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ.
Press, 2021. 368 pages. $54.95.

In the first chapter of America, Sea
Power, and the World, James Bradford’s
edited textbook on the history of the
American navy, the author explains to
students and readers what he considers
to be the three elements of a modern
Navy: purpose-built warships, a professional force—in particular, a professional
officer corps—and a shore establishment
of supporting structures and bureaucracies. In large measure, naval history
across the past several generations
has tended to focus on the first two
elements, the warships and the sailors.
William S. Dudley’s new book, Inside the
US Navy of 1812–1815, is a masterwork
of depth and research that returns the
third element, the shore establishment
and bureaucracy, to the center of the history of early American naval power. In
doing so, Dudley offers not only a great
service to our understanding of the U.S.
Navy’s past but also key reminders of the
breadth of naval topics that require our
attention in the present and the future.
In June 1812, when the United States
declared war on Great Britain, the U.S.
Navy was not ready. Americans were
taking on the most powerful maritime
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